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Zimarowski: The Limits upon a Labor Union's Duty to Control Wildcat Strikes

THE LIMITS UPON A LABOR UNION'S "DUTY"
TO CONTROL WILDCAT STRIKES
OVERVIEW

Industrial relations and collective bargaining have come a long
way since the violent industrial and economic warfare of the
pre-1940's period. But as labor unions and business organizations
became more facially "professional" in their relationship, some
union rank and file members have viewed this professionalism as
being both restrictive and conservative and have chosen to resolve
certain industrial grievances through the use of wildcat work stoppages.1 This discordant practice has created strains in the collective
bargaining relationship of the negotiating union and the employer,
in legal actions to enforce the collective bargaining argeement, inthe relationship between the union and its membership, and often
in the employer-employee relationship, all of which are disruptive
to the scope and purpose of collective bargaining under the federal

labor laws.
Section 3012 of the Labor Management Relations Act3 provides
for enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in federal and
state courts against either the breaching union or breaching employer.4 A section 301 action is a breach of contract action.' As such,
any analysis must be based upon the language of the agreement
I A wildcat strike may be defined as a work stoppage by a group of employees,
generally spontaneous in character, which is in violation of an express or implied
no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement and/or in violation of an
authorization from orders, bylaws, or constitution of the union. As used in this
article a wildcat strike action will consist of only those actions over economic
matters, rather than wildcat actions resulting from unfair labor practices or sympathy actions. At the outset it should be noted that a general no-strike clause
in a collective bargaining agreement does not cover a sympathy action. Buffalo
Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). Nor does a general nostrike clause in a collective bargaining agreement cover a wildcat dispute arising
from an employer unfair labor practice. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S.
270 (1956). See also Arlan's Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961). Since much of
this article focuses upon the collective bargaining agreement the limitations noted
above are significant.
2 29 U.S.C. 5 185 (1976). See infra note 17-22 and accompanying text.
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1976).
' See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 46 (1947); S. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., at 15-16 (1947).
5 Id.
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between the parties. Moreover, any action for a breach of the labormanagement agreement must have a basis in the conduct of the
parties. The union and the employer are responsible to each other
for a breach attributable to their affirmative conduct.' These simple statements of law and the determination of what conduct is to
be held accountable to the parties take on added tiers of complexity when the issues involve not a union sponsored or sanctioned
work stoppage but a wildcat breach of the collective bargaining
agreement by a faction of disgruntled employee-members.
Aside from section 301 actions, there are several other possible methods available to a parent union and the employer in dealing with a wildcat stoppage and its participants.' However, as will
be discussed later, the possible methods of responding to a wildcat
work stoppage are not always practical.'
Thus, the focus of this article is an examination of the extent
to which, under section 301, a union or its membership can be held
accountable for the actions of wildcat strikers. Additionally, the
article addresses the legal and practical ramifications of a union's
duty to the employer to control wildcat strikers so as to provide
the employer with his contractually created expectations.
Part I provides a definitional background and examines the
statutory construction and history of section 301. Part II examines
the leading Supreme Court cases defining the limits of accountability of a union and its members for wildcat breaches of the collective bargaining agreement. Part III examines the contours and
impact of the nonstatutory remedies available to an employer
experiencing a wildcat work stoppage. Additionally, this section
also discusses the remedies available to a parent union against its
recalcitrant membership who have chosen to engage in a wildcat
work stoppage. Part IV provides a summary synthesis of the relevant law with an aim toward discerning a workable approach to
the wildcat work stoppage problem while providing protection to
the collective bargaining agreement and the concept of union democracy.
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS
OF A SECTION 301 ACTION
Prior to the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act of
6

See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 87-100 and accompanying text.

8Id.
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1935, as amended in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations Act9
(hereinafter NLRA), labor unions and business organizations were
engaged in industrial and economic warfare with resulting disruptions in the flow of interstate commerce. The battle lines were
rather unbalanced, however, in that business organizations often
had an added channel of relief through the legal system." This channel was primarily used rather heavy handedly by business organizations with an aim toward crippling unionism and collective bargaining through the use of civil and criminal sanctions rather than to
develop a mature, peaceful, and cooperative relationship.
The courts, representing prevailing social and economic views
at the time, often held labor unions liable for damages occasioned
by organizational, representational, and wildcat work stoppages
under common law agency doctrines.1' The application of common
law agency doctrines was complicated through the innovative use
of union disclaimers and exculpatory provisions in labor contracts,
union constitutional provisions disclaiming accountability, and the
use of "straw man" type shifts in accountability whereby the union
would declare the instigators of the work stoppage (the straw men)
as without authority to call the work stoppage.12 These approaches
arguably removed the union from the taint of accountability for the
losses occasioned by the work stoppage.13 Nevertheless, the courts
painted the issue of union accountability with a broad brush and
continued not only to hold unions liable for damages occasioned by
the work stoppage but individual union members as well. 4
With the passage of the NLRA, a new era of labor-management
relations was ushered in. Nevertheless, some of the old problems
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
A complete historical development is beyond the scope of this article. There
are numerous texts on labor history and labor law providing the reader with
a thorough background. See, e.g., P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
INTHE UNITED STATES, 5 Volumes (1947-80). R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW,
(1976); CCH, LABOR LAW COURSE, 24th ed. (1979).
" See generally, Witmer, Trade UnionLiability: The Problem of the Unincor-

porated Corporations,51 YALE L.J. 40 (1941); Note, Trade UnionSuability, 32 VA.
L. REV. 394 (1946).
12 See supra note 11.
'3 See supra note 11.
" See e.g., Lawlor v. Lowewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915). This is the infamous Danbury Hatters case which Representative Case described as a "travesty ... where
individual members of a union were harried and their property attached to satisfy
a judgement for action taken by (union) officers whom they did not control." Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
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still remained. 5 Principal among these problems was the multifaceted question of the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements and the issues relating to the accountability problems for
a breach of the agreement. 6 A working framework of these issues
began with the passage of the Taft-Hartley (Labor-Management
Relations Act) amendments to the NLRA in 1947. Specifically, section 301(a) provided:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties. 7
This section provided for the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, however, it was sections 301(b) and (e)'8 that provided part of the accountability framework by defining the heretofore unincorporated labor organization as a legal, and therefore
sueable, entity. The sections also distinguished between union entity liability and the liability of the individual union members.' 9 Section 301(b) provided:
," These problems basically were: (1) the inability in many states to sue a
union as an unincorporated association; (2) the problems of service on the unincorporated association. Some states required service on every member of the
union; (3) the inability and difficulty in reaching union funds in the settlement
of judgments; And (4) the state laws patterned after federal labor law, particularly
the anti-injunction legislation, precluding an employer from certain relief form
wildcat breaches.
II This is not meant to diminish the scope and importance of issues related
to organizational and representational disputes and the problems related with
unfair labor practices. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this article.
See supra note 10.
'

29 U.S.C. S 185(a) (1976).

29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976); 29 U.S.C. 185(e) (1976).
The importance of this framework was underscored by President Truman:
We shall have to find methods not only of peaceful negotiations of labor
contract, but also of insuring industrial peace for the lifetime of such
contracts. Contracts once made must be lived up to and should be
changed only in the manner agreed upon by the parties. If we expect
confidence in agreements made, there must be responsibility and integrity on both sides in carrying them out.
If unions can break agreements with relative impunity, then such
agreements do not tend to stabilize industrial relations. The execution
of an agreement does not by itself promote industrial peace. The chief
advantage which an employer can reasonably expect from a collective
"
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Any labor organization which represents employees in an industry
affecting commerce as defined by this Act and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined by this Act shall be
bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom
it represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgement against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceableagainst
any individual member or his assets.'

Section 301(b) provided a statutory agency relationship and
the sources to be used for any potential damage recovery. Section 301(e) defined this agency relationship in terms of ordinary
principal-agent relationships.21 Section 301(e) provides:
For the purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of
whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized
or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.'
labor agreement is assurance of uninterrupted operation during the term
of the agreement. Without some effective method of assuring freedom
from economic warfare for the term of the agreement, there is little
incentive why an employer would desire to sign such a contract.
Consequently, to encourage the making of agreements and to promote
industrial peace through faithful performance by the parties, collective
agreements affecting commerce should be enforceable in the Federal
Courts. Our amendment would provide for suits by the unions as legal
entities and against unions as legal entities in the Federal Courts in
disputes affecting commerce.
The amendment specifically provides that only the assets of the union
can be attached to satisfy a money judgement; the property of the individual members of the organization would not be subject to any liability
under such a judgement. Thus the members of the union would be secure
all the advantages of limited liability without incorporation of the union.
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947). Moreover, this solved the Danbury
Hatters situation. See supra note 14.
29 U.S.C. 185(b) (1976) (Emphasis supplied).
21 29 U.S.C. 185(e) (1976).

29 U.S.C. 185(e) (1976) provides union accountability for wildcat strikes
in terms of legal agency principles. Senator Taft offered insight into the agency
relationship determination.
If the wife of a man who is working at a plant receives a lot of telephone
messages, very likely it cannot be proved that they came from the union.
There is no case then. There must be legal proof of agency in the case
of Unions as in the case of corporations ....

93 CONG. REC. 4022 (1947).
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The statutory framework has been further defined by the Supreme
Court in a series of cases which will be discussed later in the
article.
Underlying the above discussion of the statutory language is
the method of analysis used by the courts in the enforcement of
section 301 actions. In the landmark decision of Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills' the Court expressed the view that the policy
of the NLRA was to foster industrial peace, redress perceived
imbalance of power between labor unions and employers, and promote collective bargaining through making voluntary agreements
enforceable by either party.24 To give substance to these policies
the process of arbitrating disagreements was specifically approved.
The Lincoln Mills Court viewed an agreement to arbitrate as the
quid pro quo for a promise not to strike.25 Additionally, the Court
envisioned the development of a federal common law regarding
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.26
These views of labor law policy governed the court in its landmark Steelworkers Trilogy" decisions in 1960. The Steelworkers
353 U.S. 448 (1957).
24 Id.; See generally, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Carey v. Westinghouse

Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 216 (1964); Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954); Republic
Steel v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940).
n 353 U.S. at 453-55.
Id. at 456. Quoting from the Lincoln Mills opinion:
The question then is, what is the substantive law to be applied in suits
under 301(i)? We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits
under 5 301(a) is federal law which the courts must fashion from the
policy of our national labor laws. The Labor Management Relations Act
expressly furnished some substantive law. It points out what the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie
in the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express
statutory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the
legislation and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The
range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
problem. Federal interpretation of the federal law will govern, not state
law. But state law, if compatable with the purpose of 5 301, may be
resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effecutate the federal
policy. Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law
and will not be an independent source of private rights.
Id. at 456-57 (citations omitted). See also, Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S.
459 (1960); see generally, Mendelsohn, Enforceability of Arbitration Agreements
Under Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L.J. 167 (1956).
1 United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss4/8

6

Zimarowski: The Limits upon a Labor Union's Duty to Control Wildcat Strikes

1982]

LIMITS UPON LABOR UNION'S "DUTY"

939

Trilogy provided for the enforcement of arbitration awards28 as
well as defining the limits of judicial re-examination of an arbitrator's decision.' Additionally, the court defined the limits of
the arbitrators authority and the role of the collective bargaining
process and agreement., Following the labor law policy enunciated
in Lincoln Mills, the Court stated that arbitration is a matter of
contract, as such, a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which the party has not agreed to submit. 1 As
will be discussed later in the section on remedies, the broad views
on labor law policy, particularily the creation of a federal common law regarding the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, also led the Court to carve out a narrow exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act's anti-injunction provision in cases involving a section 301 action encompassing a dispute subject to
arbitration.2
It would facially appear that section 301 should be given a
reading which actively supports the policy of free collective
bargaining and arbitration. To a large extent the Court has followed this practice. This policy, however, must also strike an appropriate balance between the policy enunciations of section 301
and the principles of contract and agency law incorporated into
the section.
At this point it is useful to examine section 301 in relation
to work stoppages occuring during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. First, a section 301 action is for breach of an existing labor contract.' Therefore, the initial question is whether
there is an enforceable contract. If not, the issues derived from
a work stoppage can run the full gamut of labor relations problems from organizational disputes to intraorganizational difficulties. In these disputes section 301 has no application.' If there
11See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
See United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960).
11See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see also
Boston Printing Pressmans Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass.
1956), aff'd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
' See supra notes 1 and 11. A section 301 action does apply if the dispute
is grounded in a specific contract clause. A section 301 action applies to unfair
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is a collective bargaining agreement, the language of the contract
must be examined, the scope of obligation determined, and an
analysis conducted of the obligation owed to the corresponding
to the action or inaction of the allegedly
parties and its relationship
5
breaching party.
Most commonly, a section 301 action resulting from a work
stoppage focuses upon the breach of either a duty to arbitrate
clause or a no-strike clause. Although many contracts contain both
types of provisions it is important to note that an implied no-strike
clause can be derived from a work stoppage governed by a labor
contract containing an applicable arbitration clause even in the
absence of an express no-strike clause.
After Lincoln Mills the issue of the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements was largely settled in situations where the
breach involved either a union sponsored action or an employer
sponsored action. An interesting issue as to standing to bring a
section 301 suit was addressed by the Court in Smith v. Evening
News Association. As stated above, Lincoln Mills recognized labor
unions as having standing, as a legal entity and party to the agreement, to bring an action upon an employer's breach. 8 Conversely, Lincoln Mills recognized the employer's standing to bring an
action upon a labor union's breach. 9 In Evening News Association,
the issue centered upon whether an individual employee, acting
in his own behalf, had standing to bring a section 301 action in
response to an employer breach.4" The Court held that individual
employees have standing to bring actions as well as labor unions.4
The Court viewed the word "between" in section 301 as referring
to "contracts" rather than "suits". Therefore, the statute did not
exclude suits brought by individual employees." The Court also
held that jurisdiction under section 301 is not destroyed if the
labor practice wildcat strikes only if such an action is specifically covered in the
contract. Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 430 U.S. 290
(1977); Mastro Plastics Corp., v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
See supra note 33.
See Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
3'371
U.S. 195 (1962).
w 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
39Id.

'0 371 U.S. 195, 195 (1962).

Id. at 200. Although arguably not a direct party to the collective bargaining agreement, individual employees are brought in under seperate contracts of
employment whether the employee is a union member or not.
42 Id. at 198-99.
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breach of contract under scrutiny also constitutes an unfair labor
practice.' Moreover, a state or federal court is not preempted from
exercising jurisdiction under the preemption doctrine" developed
45
in the San DiegoBuilding Trades Council v. Garmon line of cases.
Further, as a matter of labor law policy, the Court stated that
"[section] 301 is not to be given a narrow reading." 6
In Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Local 334,47 the Supreme Court
held that section 301 provided jurisdiction to a local union in an
intra-union suit against the International Union. The Court viewed
the union constitution as a "contract between labor organizations"
and therefore section 301 is applicable. In a related case, decided
the same term, the Court also held that an employee need not
exhaust internal union grievance procedures, unless the procedures provide complete employee relief, prior to the filing of
a section 301 suit against an employer or union. 8
Assuming the existence of a collective bargaining agreement
and an applicable contract clause, four additional questions are
pertinent in a section 301 action. The answers to these questions
are particularly important in discerning accountability and facilitating contract enforcement. (1) Who instigated and controlled
the work stoppage? (2) What are the limits, if any, on the scope
of contract obligations? (3) Who may an employer hold accountable for the losses suffered? (4) What are the remedies available
to the parties of the contract? The issues spawned by these questions are discussed in the remainder of this article.
II.

LABOR UNIONS, UNION MEMBERS, AND THE

ISSUE OF ACCOUNTABILITY

This section will examine the issue of union accountability for
11Id. at 197.
4,Id.
41359 U.S. 236 (1959); see also Grocery Drivers Union Local 848 v. Seven-Up
Bottling Co. of Los Angeles 359 U.S. 434 (1959); DeVies v. Baumgartners Electric
Construction Company, 359 U.S. 498 (1959). The basis for requiring the state courts
to yield primary jurisdiction over matters involved in the regulation of labor
management relations which affect interstate commerce is to avoid interference,
by the application of varied state laws, with the administration of a uniform labor
policy.
371 U.S. at 199.
101 S.Ct. 2546 (1981).
48 Clayton v. International Union, United Auto., Aerospaceand Agricultural
Implement Wkrs., 101 S.Ct. 2088 (1981).
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unauthorized work stoppages49 occurring during the term of the
contract by focusing on three instructive cases: Atkinson v.
SinclairRefining Company'; CarbonFuel Company v. United Mine
Workers51; and Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Reis.2 These cases
establish and define the framework of accountability created by
the passage of section 301 as it relates to work stoppages occurring during the term of the collective bargaining agreement.
A. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Company
In Sinclair Refining Company, unionized employees of a
Chicago refinery struck over the docking of pay of three of their
members. The governing labor agreement contained an arbitration clause and a no-strike clause. In a three count complaint,
Sinclair Refining Company asked for damages based upon a breach
of the no-strike clause, judgement against both the union and
against twenty-four individual striking employees,' and injunctive relief.1
In the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Indiana, the union filed motions to dismiss arguing that all issues
raised by Sinclair were referable or had been referred to arbitration. The union asked for a stay pending the arbitrator's decision. Additionally, the union requested the dismissal of the section 301 action against both the union and the individual members.
The district court denied both the request for a stay pending arbitration and the motion to dismiss the section 301 action against
the union.' The district court did, however, dismiss the section
301 action against the twenty-four individual members.56 Sinclair
appealed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the refusal to dismiss
the section 301 action against the union, but reversed the district
court's dismissal of the section 301 action against the individual
,' See supra note 1.

370 U.S. 238 (1962).
444 U.S. 212 (1979).
101 S.Ct. 1836 (1981).
370 U.S. at 239-41.
u Injunctive relief was denied in Sinclair Refining Company v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195 (1961), a companion case to the one discussed. This aspect was overruled in the Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970), and
modified further in Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428
U.S. 397 (1976). See also infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
370 U.S. at 240.
56Id.
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members, thus viewing individual liability as permissible. 57
The union appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court took this opportunity to address the components of,
and accountability limits within, a section 301 action. The Court,
drawing heavily from Lincoln Mills, held that in determining
whether a section 301 action exists, a court must examine the
existing labor agreement.' Specifically, in determining whether
an issue developing into a breach of contract is a proper subject
of arbitration, the specific language of the clause and the remaining contract language must be examined. A finding that the issue
is required to be submitted to arbitration does not preclude the
filing of a section 301 action. The Court viewed the issues raised
in Sinclairas non-arbitrable and viewed Sinclair Refining's allegation of a violation of the no-strike clause sufficient to maintain
a section 301 action against the union."
More importantly, at least for the purpose of this article, the
court addressed the issue of accountability to an employer for
wildcat work stoppages under a section 301 action. The Sinclair
Court held that the count asking damages against the individual
members should be dismissed." After analyzing the statutory construction and history of section 301 the Court stated:
Consequently, in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us
to formulate the federal law to govern 301(a) suits, we are
strongly guided by and do not give a niggardly reading to, 5
301 (b). * * * We have already said in another context that §
301 (b) at least evidences "a congressional intention that the union
as an entity, like a corporation, should in the absence of an agreement be the sole source of recovery for injury inflicted by it."
This policy cannot be evaded or truncated by the simple device
of suing union agents or members, whether in contract or tort,
or both, in a separate action for damages for violation of a collective bargaining contract for which damages the union itself
is liable. The national labor policy requires and we hold that
when a union is'liable for damages for violation of the no-strike
clause, its officers and members are not liable for these damages.
Here, Count 11, as we have said, necessarily alleges union liability

Id. at 241.
Id. at 241-42.
5' Id. at 244-45.

"Id.
Id. at 247.
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but prays for damages from union agents. Where the union has
inflicted the injury it alone must pay.2
Thus, holding individual members liable for a union authorized
breach is effectively precluded by Sinclair.
The foundation was laid in a footnote to the Sinclair opinion
as to the Court's willingness to address two unanswered questions of possible union and union member liability. The footnote
read:
In reaching this conclusion, we have not ignored the argument
that Count II was drafted in order to anticipate the possible
union defense under Count I that the work stoppage was unauthorized by the union, and was a wildcat strike led by the 24
individual defendants acting not in behalf of the union but in
their personal and nonunion capacity. The language of Count
II contradicts the argument, however, and we therefore do not
reach the question of whether the count would state a proper
§ 301(a) claim if it charged unauthorized, individual action.3
The question of union liability for an unauthorized work stoppage
was addressed by the Court in Carbon Fuel," and the question
of individual liability for unauthorized work stoppages was treated
65
in Complete Auto Transit.
B.

Carbon Fuel Company v. United Mine Workers

The issue of union accountability for unauthorized work stoppages left unresolved in Sinclair, spawned varied responses in
the lower courts. Three general theories arose to ascertain union
liability for the damages caused by such unauthorized work
stoppages. 6 The first theory has been broadly titled the "all
reasonable means" approach and is based upon a union's implied
or express promise not to strike. As such, it views the union as
having a continuing duty to make every effort to prevent and
stop any union member from participating in any unauthorized
work stoppage.'7 A second theory, loosely titled the "mass action"

Id. at 248-49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 249 n.7.
See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
See generally Whitman, Wildcat Strikes: The Unions' Narrowing Path to
Rectitude?, 50 IND. L.J. 472 (1975); Note, Wildcat Strikes-CarbonFuel Company v.
UMWA, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 805 (1978).
" For a detailed exposition of this position see Petitioner's Brief, Carbon
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approach, posits that when members are acting in concert, such
action implies leadership. Therefore, liability may be placed upon
the union entity if complicity can be shown on the part of it's
"official" leadership.' Note that complicity, although poorly defined
in the lower courts, often comes very close to the definition of
agency as used in section 301(e). These two theories were rejected
by the Supreme Court in CarbonFuel in favor of a third theory that9 of common law agency as expressed in sections 301(b) and
6
(e).
In Carbon Fuel v. United Mine Workers7 the local unions of
the UMWA were engaged in 48 wildcat strikes occurring during
the years 1969 through 1973, allegedly in violation of the terms
of two collective bargaining agreements between the UMWA and
Carbon Fuel, under the aegis of the National Bituminious Coal
Wage Agreements of 1968 and 1971. A section 301 action was
filed in the District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia. The district court, adopting an "all reasonable means"
theory, found for Carbon Fuel. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, while
affirming in part the judgements against several individual local
unions, vacated the judgements against the UMWA (International)
adopting an agency approach to union liability. Carbon Fuel appealed to the Supreme Court relying upon the "all reasonable
means" theory of union liability.7
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the "all reasonable
means" theory of liability, and expressly adopted the Fourth Circuit's enunciation of the agency theory.72 Quoting extensively from
the Fourth Circuit's opinion, the Court wrote:
Fuel Company v. UMWA, 444 U.S. 212 (1979). See also, Bituminous Coal Operators
v. UMWA, 585 F.2d 586 (3d Cir. 1978); Republic Steel Corp. v. UMWA, 570 F.2d
467 (3d Cir. 1978); United States Steel v. UMWA, 534 F.2d 1063 (3d Cir. 1976);
Eazor Express, Inc. v. Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 935 (1975); Wagner Electric Corp. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach.
Wkrs., Local 1104, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974).
See Wagner Electric Corp. v. Int'l Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Wkrs.,
Local 1104, 496 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1974); Vulcan Materials Co. v. United Steelworkers
of America, 430 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 963 (1971). See also
Fishman and Brown, Union Responsibilityfor Wildcat Strikes, 21 WAYNE L. REV.
1017 (1975); Fairweather, Employer Actions and Options in Response to Strikes
in Breach of Contract,N.Y.U. 18th Ann. Conf. on Labor 129 (1966); See also supra
note 67.
See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
70

444 U.S. 212 (1979).

Id. at 213-15.
Id. at 216-17.
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The Court of Appeals stated: 'There was no evidence presented
in the district court that either the District or International
Union instigated, supported, ratified, or encouraged in any of
the work stoppages....' Under Article XVI, § 1, of the UMWA
constitution, the Local Unions lacked authority to strike without
authorization from UMWA. Moreover, UMWA had repeatedly
expressed its opposition to wildcat strikes. Petitioner thus failed
to prove agency as required by § 301(b) and (e), and we
therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that 'under these circumstances it was error for the [District Court] to7 3deny the motions of these defendants for directed verdicts.'
Carbon Fuel did raise an interesting secondary argument, the
contours of which the Court viewed approvingly. Carbon Fuel

argued that:
[E]ven if the no-strike obligation to be implied from the promise
to resolve disputes by arbitration did not carry with it the further step of implying an obligation on UMWA and District 17
to use all reasonable efforts to end an unauthorized strike, that
obligation should nevertheless be implied from the contract provision obligating UMWA and District 17 to 'maintain the integrity of the contract . . .,'

The Court reviewed the past bargaining history and existing
contractual provisions and found that, while the argument itself
had merit, there was nothing in the contract language to expressly
hold the UMWA accountable for the damages incurred by Carbon Fuel as a result of the wildcat strike. 5 On the contrary, the
Court found such a reading of the labor agreement diametrically

opposed to the bargaining history.
The inescapable conclusion to be drawn from their bargaining
history is that, whatever the integrity clause may mean, the
parties purposely decided not to impose on the union an obligation to take disciplinary or other actions to get unauthorized
strikers back to work. It would do violence to the bargaining
process and the national policy furthering free collective bargaining to impose by judicial implication a duty upon UMWA and
District 17 that the parties in arms-length bargaining first included and then purposely deleted. 6

Id.
7' Id.
7 Id.
Id.

at 218 (Brackets are part of the quote, citations are ommitted).
See also supra Brief of Petitioner, note 67.
at 218-22.
at 221.
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Thus, in addition to the 301(e) agency method of securing union
accountability, the Court left to the bargaining parties the
possibility of creating union accountability for wildcat work stoppages through the use of the contractual relationship.
C.

Complete Auto Transit v. Reis

The remaining question from the Sinclair decision as to individual liability for wildcat work stoppages in situations where
the union is not held accountable under the agency principles in
section 301(b) and (e) or through an express contract provision
7
was addressed by the Court in Complete Auto Transit v. Reis. 1
In June of 1976 the Teamsters Union and three Michigan
trucking firms were engaged in collective bargaining negotiations
for the purpose of contract renewal. Dissident member employees
of the trucking firms staged a wildcat strike holding the view that
their union was not properly representing their local interests
in the current negotiations. The then existing and applicable labor
agreement contained an express no-strike clause and subjected
all disputes to a binding grievance and arbitration procedure. Complete Auto Transit filed suit under section 301 in the District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan for damages occasioned by
the unlawful work stoppage. Complete Auto did not seek damages
from the Teamsters Union but directed their action solely against
the wildcat striking employees in their individual capacities. The
district court dismissed the complaint and held that an employer
may not sue his employees for relief for a breach of a collective
bargaining agreement whether or not-the union may also be liable.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed again holding that section 301 does
not create an action for damages against individual union
8
members. Complete Auto appealed the ruling.7
The Supreme Court affirmed in a seven to two decision written by Justice Brennan. The Court extensively reviewed the
legislative history of section 301 and related statutes and observed:
Section 301 by its terms forbids a money judgement against a
union from being enforced against individual union members.
It is a mistake to suppose that Congress thereby suggested by
negative implication that employees should be held liable where
their union is not liable for the strike. Although lengthy and
101 S.Ct. 1836 (1981).

8 Id. at 1838.
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complex, the legislative history of S 301 clearly reveals Congress'
intent to shield individual employees from liability for damages
arising from their breach of the no-strike clause of a collectivebargaining agreement, whether or not the union participated
in or authorized the illegality. Indeed Congress intended this
result even though it might leave the employer unable to recover
for his losses.'

To support this view, the Court examined a forerunner of section 301 and found persuasive two excerpts from the legislative

history. The Court quoted Senator Taft:
If the union violates its collective bargaining agreement it is
responsible but no individual member is responsible, and he can
in no way be deprived of his rights. But if the union tries to
keep its contract, and in violation of its undertaking, some of
its members proceed to strike, then the employer may fire those
members and they do not have the protection of the Wagner
Act.80
And quoting the House discussion of the bill the Court found
Representative Case's remarks persuasive:
Individual members of a union are not made liable for any money
judgement, I might point out, but only the union as an entity.
If employees strike in violation of their agreement the only individual penalty that can be employed is the forfeiture of their
right to employment under that contract which is cured when
the employer reemploys them."
Upon further examination of the legislative history, the Court
found probative a congressional rejection of a provision imposing
"liability against individuals for unlawful concerted activity."8

Accordingly, in affirming the Sixth Circuit, the Court stated:
Thus, while § 301(b) explicitly addresses only union authorized
violations of a collective bargaining agreement, the 'penumbra'
of S 301(b), as informed by its legislative history, establishes that
Congress meant to exclude individual strikers from damages
liability, whether or not they were authorized by their union
to strike. The Legislative debates and the process of legislative
Id. at 1840 (citations ommitted).
Id. at 1841. The provision referred to above is a forerunner of 5 301. It
was commonly referred to as § 10 of the Case Bill, H.R. REP.No. 4908,79th cong.
2d Sess. (1946). See 92 CONG. REc. at 765 and 5705.
8 Id. at 1842, citing 92 CONG. REC. 5930-31.
' Id. at 1843.
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amendment demonstrate that Congress deliberately chose to
allow a damages remedy for breach of the no strike provision
of a collective bargaining agreement only against unions, not
individuals, and, as to unions, only when they participated in
or authorized the strike. Congress itself balanced the competing
advantages and disadvantages inherent in the possible remedies
to combat wildcat strikes, and we are 'strongly guided by' its
choice.'
The Court also viewed as unsupportable Complete Auto's
argument that such a cause of action was indespensable to
preserve the integrity of the collective bargaining agreement.,
Justice Powell, concurring, also expressed concern over the lack
of practical remedies available against wildcat strikers but felt
guided by the congressional choice.85 Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist dissented arguing a strict constructionist view
of section 301, maintaining that since individual liability was not
specifically excluded such a remedy is legislatively permissible.86
D.

Summary

Summarizing thus far, it seems clear that unions have no
liability and therefore no accountability for the wildcat work stoppages, unless the union can be brought in under section 301(b) and
(e), agency principles, or an express contract provision. Further,
individual wildcat strikers are insulated from an employer
damages action for breach of contract under section 301, thereby
leaving employers with only the more traditional remedies against
recalcitrant employees. The question of remedies available to
employers and the unions against the wildcat strikers is discussed
in the following sections.
III.

REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO CONTROL
WILDCAT STRIKERS

When faced with a wildcat strike situation both an employer
and a union have an array of remedies availabe to attempt to
defuse the wildcat situation or serve as an example to the present employees to prevent future strikes. The remedies are usually
used in conjunction with other actions and chosen with an aim
toward serving the interests of the proponent union or employer.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1844-45 (citations and footnotes omitted).
1845 n.18.
1845. (Powell, J., concurring).
1849. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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The interests of the employer are the timely resumption of production and the preservation of profits. The union's interests can
be thought of in terms of actions or inactions which best serve
the unions internal organizational integrity and labor unity.
A. Employer Remedies
When faced with a wildcat work stoppage an employer has
three general remedies available: (1) injunctive relief; (2) discipline
or discharge; and, (3) a section 301 damage action. The section 301
action has been discussed in the preceding sections of this article. This section will exmaine the employer injunctive and
discipline options in dealing with a wildcat work stoppage.
In SinclairRefining Company v. Atkinson" the Supreme Court
held that injunctive relief was made unavailable to the employer
in response to a wildcat work stoppage by section four of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1931.1 The Supreme Court altered this
view, overruling SinclairRefining in this regard, in Boys Markets,
Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770.89 The Boys Market decision
created a narrow exception to Norris-LaGuardia's prohibition
against the use of injunctions to defuse labor strike actions. This
narrow exception, adopted in the Boys Markets decision, is as
follows:
A District Court entertaining an action under S 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it decides that the case is one in which an injunction is appropriate despite the Norris-LaGuardia act. When a strike is
sought to be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both
parties are contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court
may issue no injunctive order until it first holds that the contract does have that effect; and the employer should be ordered
to arbitrate, as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond this, the District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an injunction would be warranted
under ordinary principles of equity ... and whether the employer
will suffer more from the denial of the injunction than will the
union from its issuance."
Thus, Boys Markets provided employers with a judicial remedy
370 U.S. 195 (1962).
29 U.S.C. S 104 (1976).
398 U.S. 235 (1976).
Id. at 254, quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. at 228 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that could be invoked whenever a strike arose in the face of a
mandatory contractual grievance-arbitration procedure. 9 Note,
however, that the Boys Markets remedy does not apply, absent
an express contract provision, to situations where the strike is
a sympathy action, or to situations involving an unfair labor practice allegation.'
Normally, if the wildcat dispute is subject to binding
grievance-arbitration procedures and a Boys Markets injunction
is available, this relief serves the employers interests so that further section 301 relief is not pursued. First, it restores production quickly. Second, the employer can then selectively discipline
recalcitrant employees in response to the parameters determined
by the sensitivity of the situation. Of course the above assumes
that the labor-management relationship has not deteriorated to
the point where the strikers are militantly opposed to any and
all actions on the part of the employer and implementation by
the courts. And third, the union is unlikely to fight the injunction
in court or aid and counsel the wildcat strikers for fear of ratifying the strike action and thereby subjecting the union to a full
section 301 damage action.
An employer always has the option of disciplining or discharging the wildcat strikers as such activity constitutes unprotected
concerted actions by the employees and is thereby not protected
by the NLRA.93 This may not be an advisable option, as it may
aggravate an already existing tense and militant situation rather
than serving as an example or a deterrent to other employees.94
Additionally, such discipline may polarize a work force causing
future discipline problems, production delays, employee soldiering and sabotage, and future employee personnel selection problems. Other problems are equally acute such as tying up the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures with its subsequent
costs in money, time, and personnel, as well as possible outside
91 Id.

Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397 (1976). See also
supra note 1.
-ISee NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); American News Co.,
55 N.L.R.B. No. 1302 (1944); NLRB v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 217 F.2d
366 (9th Cir. 1954); Harnischefeger Corp. v. NLRB, 207 F.2d 575 (7th Cir. 1953).
See generally Shearer, Legal Remedies and PracticalConsiderationsin Dealing With A Wildcat Strike, 22 DRAKE L. REV. 46 (1972); Comment, ParentUnion
Liability for Strikes in Breach of Contract, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1028 (1979); see also
supra note 68.
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court actions alleging NLRA violations or tort damages.
As such, any decision on the part of an employer as to the
scope of his disciplinary reaction to a wildcat strike must be based
on a reasoned approach assessing the gravity and sensitivity of
the then existing labor-management relationship.
B.

Union Remedies

It should be recognized again that a wildcat strike is
not in the best interests of the union and in fact is often
mental for the union as well as the employer. As such, the
often is, at least morally, obligated to take some action to
the dispute to a conclusion.

often
detriunion
bring

Unions have the power to discipline their members for engaging in wildcat work stoppages provided that there is no prohibition of such discipline in the Union's constitution and bylaws. This
discipline may take the form of expulsion, suspension and fines."
This disciplinary power is subject to the legal restrictions of union
membership, the NLRA protections of section 7 rights, and the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act's (hereinafter
LMRDA) procedural protections.' The restriction of full membership is rather obvious as only those employees who have agreed
to subscribe to union discipline rules can be disciplined under the
existing federal labor law. The unfair practices delineated in
NLRA section 8(b) provide limits upon a union's conduct in disciplining its membership. Additionally, LMRDA sections 101(a)(1),1
101(a)(2),98 and 101(a)(4)99 allow a union to enforce reasonable rules
of conduct but also allow a disciplined member to sue the union
for any allegedly improper treatment.10
In addition to the legal restrictions upon a union's discipline
powers in relation to wildcat strikers there are also practical
restrictions. First, as in Complete Auto Transit, some wildcat
strikes are frequently against the incumbent union leadership as
well as the employer. This twist often makes disciplinary actions
on the part of the union viewed as a political move to stifle opposi" See generally Note, Into the Mire of Uncertainity: Union DisciplinaryFines
and NLRA Section 8(b)(1)(A), 84 W. VA. L. REv. 411 (1982).

29
" 29
" 29
29

U.S.C. 401 (1976).
U.S.C. 411(a)(1) (1976).
U.S. 5 411(a)(2) (1976).
U.S. § 411(a)(4) (1976).

'" See supra note 95.
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tion. Second, disciplining wildcat union members will almost
always be viewed as the union siding with the employer, thereby
spawning dissension and factionalism in the rank and file members.
This may have the effect of creating opposition to existing union
leadership where none had existed before. And finally, since a
union is not required to deter wildcat strikes under the rationale
in CarbonFuel, there is nothing to compel a union to discipline
its wildcatting members.
Further, there is no "profit" in disciplining the union membership. It is not in the interests of internal union integrity or unity
for a union to enforce discipline on its membership for actions
perceived as necessary and correct in the eyes of the rank and file.
Ill.

DEVELOPING A UNION DUTY TO CONTROL
WILDCAT STRIKERS

It seems clear that Congress chose not to allow employers
a remedy against the individual wildcat strikers or the nonparticipating or non-authorizing union. CarbonFuel, discussed earlier,
specifically removes any "duty" upon a union to mitigate wildcat
strike damage absent a specific contract clause. Complete Auto
Transit exempts individual wildcat strikers from individual liability. Those previously discussed statutes and cases set up the
parameters of an employer's wildcat strike relief.
As discussed previously the legal limits of a union's "duty"
to control the wildcat strikers is narrowly drawn. Thus, an employer must rely upon injunctive remedies and internal discipline
and discharge which, as discussed earlier, may not serve the interests and needs of the employer. Further, a union may well be
disinclined to discipline its membership as these actions may not
serve the union's needs and interests. It seems apparent, therefore,
that an employer is without an effective remedy to counter wildcat
work stoppages under existing federal labor law.
There are two possible methods of overcoming this lack of
an effective remedy and simultaneously imposing a duty upon the
union to control its recalcitrant members. The first approach would
be through legislative intervention, amending section 301 to impose liability for wildcat work stoppages on unions and individual
members. The second, and more viable approach, would be through
an express clause in the collective bargaining agreement specifically requiring the union to indemnify the employer for its losses
and/or control wildcat strikers through the use of internal union
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discipline. The remainder of this article will discuss these two
alternatives.
Amending section 301 to impose liability on individual wildcat
strikers would, in effect, resurrect the spectre of the Danbury
Hatters travesty"' along with a plethora of problems stemming
from the institution of individual actions. These might include service, joinder and jurisdiction problems, and also problems with
defenses, including arguments of National Labor Relations Board
deferral, accusations of discrimination and protected concerted activity, and arguments that the local courts lack the necessary labor
law expertise. When added to the common problems of civil jury
trials, this alternative may create a dismal swamp for overworked
trial courts.
In addition to the judicial economy argument, actions against
individual union members may be too powerful a weapon to place
in the hands of an employer already possessing extensive economic
and political power. Such a power struggle, fought both inside
and outside the courts, is likely to be no contest. The result would
be either to polarize the respective positions of the parties or lead
to abuse of a submissive and beaten work force. Either result is
inconsistent with industrial peace and labor democracy, and fails
to serve the public policies involved.
Amending section 301 to require vicarious liability of unions
for wildcat actions can also have disruptive effects on industrial
peace and union democracy. First, such liability would be imposed
from the outside thereby having the tendency to polarize union
positions. This polarization might cause a union to authorize more
strikes and render the negotiation of a no strike clause more difficult. Also, a union might adopt the strategy that it is going
to be held liable regardless, so it is best to make the greatest
political gains out of the situation. Such an amendment, therefore,
would probably lead to industrial uncertainity.
More importantly, however, such legislatively imposed
vicarious liability virtually destroys any concept of union
democracy and and thereby destroys the union concept itself. If
a wildcat strike by a minority of employee-members binds
the entire union then rule by the majority is replaced by rule
by the minority. This is obviously not conducive to industrial peace
1*1See

supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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and it tends to breed industrial uncertainity in the workplace and
in the flow of interstate commerce.
This is not to say that unions, because of their democratic
structure, should be immune from damages occasioned by wildcat
work stoppages. Imposing liability from the outside, however, is
too broad and wrought with danger. A better approach is that
which is enunciated in section 301(b) and (e)'s statement of agency relationship, an approach similar to that applied in determining liability of the industrial counterpart and, more importantly,
an internal oriented approach.
A second internal approach is through the negotiation of an
express clause in the collective bargaining agreement making the
union liable for wildcat strike damages. The idea of such a clause
was viewed approvingly in the CarbonFuel case. Such a clause
serves the interests of industrial peace and union democracy by
being voluntarily created and agreed upon by the parties to the
collective bargaining agreement.
Negotiation of such a clause, however, could prove difficult
for a variety of reasons. First, since it is akin to the standard
no-strike clause it is not a mandatory bargaining item.10 As such,
taking the clause to impasse is an unfair labor practice."3 Second,
the scope of the clause could be drafted too broadly thereby encompassing the relinquishment of certain employee-members' protected rights under NLRA section 7 with respect to concerted
activity. Such a clause may constitute an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA. T And third, the clause has no direct quid pro
quo thereby rendering its negotiation difficult. This difficulty is
compounded by the political and economic unattractiveness of the
clause to the union for the reasons previously discussed in the
remedies section. Moreover, as the sample clause below will indicate certain aspects of such a clause necessary to make it
palatable to the union may make it unattractive to the employer.
The collective bargaining agreement is the key to the wildcat
strike problem. And a contract clause is the best approach to the
problem of a union's duty to control wildcat strikers. Such a clause
might serve several functions in the labor-management relationship. First, the clause could contain a subsection which requires
Il'

NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

103Id.

"'4Id. See also supra note 1.
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the union to take specific actions in response to a wildcat breach.
Second, in addition to specific responses by the union to a wildcat
dispute the clause could contain a provision requiring the union
and the employer to maintain the integrity of the contract. Such
responses emanating from this clause would be governed by the
development of an industrial common law. Third, the clause could
contain the equivalent to a liquidated damages clause making
whole the employer for damages occasioned by the wildcat strike
and possibly making the union whole for damages and lost wages
occasioned by an unlawful employer lockout or shutdown. Fourth,
the clause could provide immunity for wildcat strikers from
employer imposed discharge and discipline thereby making union
reconcilation efforts easier. Note that this clause would not
preclude union discipline of the striking employees. However, note
also that the collective bargaining contract can not mandate union
imposed discipline without triggering a possible unfair practice
charge.1 0 5 Finally, such a clause could limit an employer's use of
the injunctive remedy and everpresent contempt of court fines
for striker non-compliance. This ritual of contempt fines is often
an obstacle to strike settlement and in practice the fines are often
waived to secure the settlement.
Note that the above discussion is not meant to suggest the
creation of a "boilerplate" clause favoring either management or
labor union. There are aspects of the clause that both sides will
find difficult to accept. But the purpose of the discussion is to
demonstrate an alternative and preemptive solution to the wildcat
strike problem. With the same purpose in mind, the following sample clause is offered for illustrative purposes:
(a) During the term of this agreement, it is understood that
the Union will not cause or authorize its membership to strike,
sitdown, slowdown, or engage in any work stoppage or limitation upon production. Furthermore, it is understood that no
Union agent shall authorize, encourage, or assist in any such
strike or stoppage of any plant or premises of the Company,
nor will it participate in, counsel or induce any strike action.
Such strike action as used in this provision specifically includes,
but is not limited to, economic strikes, unfair labor practice
strikes, and sympathy strikes.'
105
'0

Allen Bradley Co. v. NLRB, 286 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1961).
This is a basic no strike clause, some form of which is found in most col-
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(b) During the term of this agreement, it is understood that
the Union and the Company hereto affirm their intention to maintain the integrity of the contract and to exercise their best efforts to prevent stoppages of work by strike, lockout, or permanant or partial shutdown pending adjustment or adjudication
of the disputes and grievances in the manner provided in this
agreement.'1'
(c) If a work stoppage occurs during the term of this agreement, the Union's best efforts to stop said action shall, at a
minimum, include:
(1) Notify all employees immediately in the event of a strike
that the strike is unauthorized and in violation of the agreement;
(2) Publicly announce through the local newspaper and local
radio that the strike is unauthorized and in violation of the
agreement;
(3) State in writing to the employees that the strike is in
violation of the agreement;
(4) Inform employees who participate in the strike that they
may be subject to union discipline unless they immediately cease
such unauthorized actions;
(5) Make every reasonable effort to communicate, on a continuing basis, with the membership to induce employees to cease
such unauthorized actions."°
(d)(1) Subject to Union compliance with parts (b) and (c), the
Union hereby agrees to make whole the company for _%
of
the actual provable losses, up to an amount not to exceed $ -,
incurred as a direct result of an employee instigated action
resulting in an unauthorized work stoppage.
lective bargaining agreements. Unfair labor practice strikes and sympathy strikes
have been expressly added to get around the problems generated by the Buffalo
Forge and Mastro Plasticsopinions. See supra note 1.A form of the basic no lockout
clause is contained in part (b).
'" This section is similar in form to the "maintain the integrity of the Contract" clause as used in CarbonFuel. By itself, it may impose a duty upon the
union to control wildcat strikers. The following clause clarifies this provision

by defining best efforts and thereby contractually requires certain actions on
the part of the union. On the union side, if the clause relating to shutdowns,
lockouts, and partial or permanant closing, is coupled with a strong subcontracting clause this may make this aspect attractive to the union and provide some
worker economic protection. The development of this clause and related aspects
could be instrumental in providing the "quid pro quo." Note that the subject
of partial or permanent closings is not a mandatory bargaining item. See First
Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 101 S.Ct. 2573 (1981).
..
8 This is not meant to be an exhaustive list but can and should be adjusted
to the nuances of a particular labor-management relationship.
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(2) The Company hereby agrees to make whole the Union
and all affected employees for __O/o of the wages lost to all
employees ready and able to report for work, up to an amount
not to exceed $ -, incurred as a direct result of a Company
instigated lockout, or permanant or partial shutdown.
(3) Such determination as to actual losses and causality shall
be made by a panel of three arbitrators; one selected by the
Company, one selected by the Union, and the third selected pursuant to the arbitrator selection procedures contained in this
agreement. Such a determination by the panel as to actual losses
19
suffered shall be final and binding upon the parties.
(e) Subject to Union compliance with parts (b) and (c), the Company hereby agrees not to take any disciplinary action against
any employee who has engaged in an unauthorized work stoppage. This provision does not limit the ability of a Union to
discipline its membership for un-authorized strike action."'
(f) Subject to Union compliance with parts (b) and (c), the Company hereby agrees not to resort to the use of an injunction
to stop the unauthorized work stoppage unless said request for
injunctive relief is agreed to by the Union. Further, subject to
compliance with part (d), the Union and the Company agree to
waive any and all legal actions arising out of a strike, lockout,
or permanant or partial shutdown."'
There is no easy solution to the problem of wildcat work stoppages. The above discussion centers upon the collective bargaining process as the key to any solution. However, the collective
bargaining process only functions as well as the parties allow it
to function. Thus, the whole labor-management relationship will
dictate whether or not a company will be able to minimize work

11 This section is most controversal for a variety of reasons discussed
throughout this article. Such a provision, however, demands a peaceful and
cooperative labor-management relationship in order to function properly. Additionally, it may be advantageous to impose time limits on the above discussed
procedure for arbitration. See also infra note 112.
110 This section is designed to allow the union added leverage necessary to
get the striking workers back on the job quickly and settle the dispute through
the contractual grievance procedures after the rank and file have made their
"point". Further, such a clause may well prove attractive to a labor union for
bargaining purposes. See also infra note 112.
"' This section is also controversial for similar reasons as discussed in note
109. However, it does allow greater flexibility and leverage in bringing the wildcat
strikers back to work and may be attractive for bargaining purposes. See also
infra note 112.
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stoppages. If the relationship is plagued with mistrust and unscrupulous behavior then the contract has less value as a predictor of future behavior than does the contract created by a progressive labor-management relationship. The above recommendations can be thought of as band-aid measures. If work stoppages
stem from the hostile nature of the labor-management relationship, taking these measures is akin to putting a band-aid on a
large, deep gash. It will simply not solve the problem. However,
if the nature of the labor-management relationship is progressive
and cooperative, the clause in the collective bargaining agreement
can go a long way in preventing frequent work stoppages and
in removing production uncertainity from the workplace."'
James Bryan Zimarowski

". The clause recommended above is obviously subject to criticism. First,
it could be termed "naive" in that very few unions or business organizations would
discuss such a provision, let alone agree to one. The response to this is that given
the framework in which labor-management relations take place, what else is there.
A second observation goes more to the heart of the matter. Such a clause would
only be possible in a favorable labor-management environment, the environment
in which it is needed least. Perhaps such a clause will, if other aspects of the
labor-management relationship are generally positive, achieve the goals of the
NLRA.
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